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Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attackers apply
multiple sophisticated methods to continuously and stealthily
steal information from the targeted cloud storage systems and
can even induce the storage system to apply a specific defense
strategy and attack it accordingly. In this paper, the interactions
between an APT attacker and a defender allocating their Central
Processing Units (CPUs) over multiple storage devices in a cloud
storage system are formulated as a Colonel Blotto game. The
Nash equilibria (NEs) of the CPU allocation game are derived for
both symmetric and asymmetric CPUs between the APT attacker
and the defender to evaluate how the limited CPU resources,
the date storage size and the number of storage devices impact
the expected data protection level and the utility of the cloud
storage system. A CPU allocation scheme based on “hotbooting”
policy hill-climbing (PHC) that exploits the experiences in similar
scenarios to initialize the quality values to accelerate the learning
speed is proposed for the defender to achieve the optimal APT
defense performance in the dynamic game without being aware of
the APT attack model and the data storage model. A hotbooting
deep Q-network (DQN)-based CPU allocation scheme further
improves the APT detection performance for the case with a large
number of CPUs and storage devices. Simulation results show
that our proposed reinforcement learning based CPU allocation
can improve both the data protection level and the utility of the
cloud storage system compared with the Q-learning based CPU
allocation against APTs.
Index Terms—Colonel Blotto game, advanced persistent
threats, cloud security, CPU allocation, reinforcement learning,
data protection level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage and cyber systems are vulnerable to Ad-
vanced Persistent Threats (APTs), in which an attacker ap-
plies multiple sophisticated methods such as the injection of
multiple malwares to continuously and stealthily steal data
from the targeted cloud storage system [1], [2] and [3]. APT
attacks are difficult to detect and have caused privacy leakage
and millions of dollars’ loss [4] and [5]. According to [6],
more than 65% of the organizations in a survey in 2014 have
experienced more APT attacks in their IT networks than last
year.
The FlipIt game proposed in the seminal work [7] formu-
lates the stealthy and continuous APT attacks and designs the
scan interval to detect APTs on a given cyber system. The
game theoretic study in [8] has provided insights to design
the optimal scan intervals of a cyber system against APTs.
Prospect theory has been applied in [9] to investigate the
probability distortion of an APT attacker against cloud storage
and cumulative prospect theory has been used in [10] to model
the frame effect of an APT attacker to choose the attack
interval. Most existing APT games ignore the strict resource
constraints in the APT defense, such as the limited number
of Central Processing Units (CPUs) of a storage defender
and an APT attacker [7] and [11]. However, a cloud storage
system with limited number of CPUs cannot scan all the data
stored on the storage devices in a given time slot. To this
end, encryptions and authentication techniques are applied to
protect data privacy for cloud storage systems. On the other
hand, an APT attacker with limited CPU resources cannot
install malwares to steal all the data on the cloud storage
system in a single time slot either [12].
It is challenging for a cloud storage system to optimize
the CPU allocation to scan the storage devices under a large
number of CPUs and storage devices without being aware of
the APT attack strategy. Therefore, we use the Colonel Blotto
game (CBG), a two-player zero-sum game with multiple
battlefields to model the competition between an APT attacker
and a storage defender, each with a limited total number of
CPUs over a given number of storage devices. The player who
applies more resources on a battlefield in a Colonel Blotto
game wins it, and the overall payoff of a player in the game
is proportional to the number of the winning battlefields [13].
The Colonel Blotto game has been recently applied to design
the spectrum allocation of network service providers [14], the
jamming resistance methods for Internet of Things [15] and
[16].
Our previous work in [17] assumes that each storage device
has the same amount of data and addresses APT attackers
that does not change the attack policy. However, the storage
devices usually have different amount of the data with different
priority levels, and the data size and their priority level also
change over time. By allocating more CPUs to scan the storage
devices with more data, a storage defender can achieve a
higher data protection level. Therefore, this work extends to a
dynamic cloud storage system whose data size changes over
time and addresses smart APTs, in which an attacker that can
learn the defense strategy first chooses the attack strength to
induce the storage system to apply a specific defense strategy
and then attacks it accordingly.
2By applying time sharing (or division), a defender can use
a single CPU to scan multiple storage devices as battlefields
to detect APTs in a time slot, and an attacker can use a single
CPU to attack multiple devices with a single CPU yielding a
roughly continuous CBG. According to [13], a pure-strategy
Colonel Blotto game rarely achieves Nash equilibria (NEs).
Therefore, we focus on the CBG with mixed strategies, in
which both players choose their CPU allocation distribution
and introduce randomness in their action selection to fool their
opponent. The conditions under which the NEs exist in the
CPU allocation game are provided to disclose how the number
of storage devices, the size of the data stored in each storage
device and the total number of CPUs in which the defender
observes the impact on the data protection level and the utility
of the cloud storage system against APTs.
The CBG-based CPU allocation game provides a framework
to understand the strategic behavior of both sides, and the NE
strategy relies on the detailed prior knowledge about the APT
attack model. In particular, the cloud defender has to know
the total number of the attack CPUs and the attack policy
over the storage devices, which is challenging to accurately
estimate in a dynamic storage system. On the other hand,
the repeated interactions between the APT attacker and the
defender over multiple time slots can be formulated as a
dynamic CPU allocation game, and the defender can choose
the security strategy according to the attack history. The APT
defense decisions in the dynamic CPU allocation game can
be approximately formulated as a Markov decision process
(MDP) with finite states, in which the defender observes the
state that consists of the previous attack CPU allocation and
the current data storage distribution. Therefore, a defender
can apply reinforcement learning (RL) techniques such as Q-
learning to achieve the optimal CPU allocation over the storage
devices to detect APTs in a dynamic game.
The policy hill-climbing (PHC) algorithm as an extension of
Q-learning in the mixed-strategy game [18] enables an agent
to achieve the optimal strategy without being aware of the
underlying system model. For instance, the PHC-based CPU
allocation scheme as proposed in our previous work in [17]
enables the defender to protect the storage devices with limited
number of CPUs without being aware of the APT attack
model. In this work, a “hotbooting” technique as a combina-
tion of transfer learning [19] and RL exploits experiences in
similar scenarios to accelerate the initial learning speed. We
propose a “hotbooting” PHC-based CPU allocation scheme
that chooses the number of the CPUs on each storage device
based on the current state and the quality or Q-function that
is initialized according to the APT detection experiences to
reduce the exploration time at the initial learning stage.
We apply deep Q-network (DQN), a deep reinforcement
learning technique recently developed by Google DeepMind
in [20] and [21] to accelerate the learning speed of the
defender for the case with a large number of storage devices
and defense CPUs. More specifically, the DQN-based CPU
allocation exploits the deep convolutional neural network
(CNN) to determine the Q-value for each CPU allocation and
thus suppress the state space observed by the cloud storage
defender. Simulation results demonstrate that this scheme can
improve the data protection level, increase the APT attack cost,
and enhance the utility of the cloud storage system against
APTs.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
(1) We formulate a CBG-based CPU allocation game against
APTs with time-variant data size and attack policy. The NEs
of the game are provided to disclose the impact of the number
of storage devices, the amonut of data stored in each device
and the total number of CPUs on the data protection level of
the cloud storage system.
(2) A hotbooting PHC-based CPU allocation scheme is de-
veloped to achieve the optimal CPU allocation over the storage
devices with low computational complexity and improve the
data protection level compared with the PHC-based scheme as
proposed in [17].
(3) A hotbooting DQN-based CPU allocation scheme is
proposed to furture accelerate the learning speed and improve
the resistance against APTs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We review
the related work in section II, and present the system model in
section III. We formulate a CBG-based CPU allocation game
and derive the NEs of the game in Section IV. A hotbooting
PHC-based CPU allocation scheme and a hotbooting DQN-
based scheme are developed in Sections V and VI, respec-
tively. Simulation results are provided in Section VII and the
conclusions of this work are drawn in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The seminal work in [7] formulates a stealthy takeover
game between an APT attacker and a defender, who compete
to control a targeted cloud storage system. The APT scan
interval on a single device has been optimized in [22] based
on the FlipIt model without considering the constraint of
scanning CPUs. The game between an overt defender and
a stealthy attacker as investigated in [23] provides the best
response of the periodic detection strategy against a non-
adaptive attacker. The online learning algorithm as developed
in [24] achieves the optimal timing of the security updates in
the FlipIt game, and reduces the regret of the upper confidence
bound compared with the periodic defense strategy. The APT
defense game formulated in [12] extends the FlipIt game in
[7] to multi-node systems with limited resources. The game
among an APT attacker, a cloud defender and a mobile device
as formulated in [25] combines the APT defense game in [7]
with the signaling game between the cloud and the mobile
device. The evolutionary game can capture the long term
continuous behavior of APTs on cloud storage [26]. The
information-trading and APT defense game formulated in [27]
analyzes the joint APT and insider attacks. The subjective
view of APT attackers under uncertainty scanning duration
was analyzed in [9] based on prospect theory.
Colonel Blotto game models the competition between two
players each with resource constraints. For example, the
Colonel Blotto game with mixed-strategy as formulated in [14]
studies the spectrum allocation of network service providers,
yielding a fictitious play based allocation approach to compute
3the equilibrium of the game with discrete spectrum resources.
The anti-jamming communication game as developed in [28]
optimizes the transmit power over multiple channels in cog-
nitive radio networks based on the NE of the CBG. The
CBG-based jamming game as formulated in [15] shows that
neither the defender nor the attacker can dominate with limited
computational resources. The CBG-based jamming game as
formulated in [16] shows how the number of subcarriers im-
pacts the anti-jamming performance of Internet of Things with
continuous and asymmetric radio power resources. The CBG-
based phishing game as formulated in [29] investigates the
dynamics of the detect-and-takedown defense against phishing
attacks.
Reinforcement learning techniques have been used to im-
prove network security. For instance, the minimax-Q learning
based spectrum allocation as developed in [30] increases the
spectrum efficiency in cognitive radio networks. The DQN-
based anti-jamming communication scheme as designed in
[31] applies DQN to choose the transmit channel and node
mobility and can increase the signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio of secondary users against cooperative jamming in cogni-
tive radio networks. The PHC-based CPU allocation scheme as
proposed in [17] applies PHC to improve the data protection
level of the cloud storage system against APTs. Compared
with our previous work in [17], this work improves the game
model by incorporating the time-variant data storage model.
We also apply both the hotbooting technique and DQN to
accelerate the learning speed and thus improve the security
performance for the case with a large number of storage
devices and CPUs against the smart APT attacks in the
dynamic cloud storage system.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the cloud storage system consists
of D storage devices, where device i stores data of size B
(k)
i
at time k, with 1 ≤ i ≤ D. Let B(k) =
[
B
(k)
i
]
1≤i≤D
be
the data size vector of the cloud storage system, and B̂(k) =∑D
i=1B
(k)
i denote the total amount of the data stored in the
cloud storage system at time k..
APT 
attacker 
..
.
..
.
 SM  CPUs  SN  CPUs
Number of CPUs 
to scan device i
Number of CPUs 
to attack device i
Defender of the 
cyber system
N2
(k)
Storage device 1
Storage device 2
...
Storage device D
Fig. 1. CPU allocation game, in which a defender with SM CPUs chooses
the CPU allocation strategy to scan the D storage devices in the cloud storage
system against an APT attacker with SN CPUs.
In this work, we consider an APT attacker who combines
multiple attack methods, tools, and techniques such as [5] to
steal data from the targeted cloud storage system over a long
time. The attacker aims to steal more data from the D storage
devices with SN CPUs without being detected. At time k,
N
(k)
i out of the SN CPUs are used to attack storage device
i, with
∑D
i=1N
(k)
i ≤ SN . The attack CPU allocation at time
k is given by N(k) =
[
N
(k)
i
]
1≤i≤D
∈ △A, where the attack
action set △A is given by
△A =
{
[Ni]1≤i≤D
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ Ni ≤ SN ; D∑
i=1
Ni ≤ SN
}
. (1)
A defender uses SM CPUs to scan the D storage devices in
the cloud storage system and aims to detect APTs as early as
possible to minimize the total amount of the data stolen by the
attacker. At time k,M
(k)
i out of the SM CPUs are allocated to
scan the device i for APTs, with
∑D
i=1M
(k)
i ≤ SM . As each
time slot is quite short, the storage defender can not scan all
the data stored in the D storage devices in a single time slot.
The defense CPU allocation vector denoted by Mk is defined
as M(k) =
[
M
(k)
i
]
1≤i≤D
∈ △D, where the defense action set
△D is given by
△D =
{
[Mi]1≤i≤D
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤Mi ≤ SM ; D∑
i=1
Mi ≤ SM
}
. (2)
If the attacker uses more CPUs than the defender in the
APT defense game, the data stored in the storage device are
assumed to be at risk. More specifically, the data stored in
storage device i are assumed to be safe if the number of
the defense CPUs is greater than the number of attack CPUs
at that time, i.e., M
(k)
i > N
(k)
i , and the data are at risks if
M
(k)
i < N
(k)
i . If M
(k)
i = N
(k)
i , both players have an equal
opportunity to control the storage device. Let sgn(x) denote
a sign function, with sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0, sgn(x) = −1 if
x < 0, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the data protection level of
the cloud storage system at time k denoted by R(k) is defined
as the normalized size of the “safe” data that are protected by
the defender and is given by
R(k) =
1
B̂(k)
D∑
i=1
B
(k)
i sgn (Mi −Ni) . (3)
For ease of reference, our commonly used notations are
summarized in Table I. The time index k in the superscript
is omitted if no confusion occurs.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF SYMBOLS AND NOTATIONS
D Number of storage devices
SM/N Total number of defense/attack CPUs
M(k)/N(k) Defense/attack CPU allocation vector
△D/A Action set of the defender/attacker
u
(k)
D/A Utility of the defender/attacker at time k
B̂(k) Total size of the stored data at time k
B(k) Data size vector of D devices at time k
R(k) Data protection level at time k
4IV. CBG-BASED CPU ALLOCATION GAME
Colonel Blotto game is a powerful tool to study the strategic
resource allocation of two agents each with limited resources
in a competitive environment. Therefore, the interactions be-
tween the APT attacker and the defender of the cloud storage
system regarding their CPU allocations can be formulated as
a Colonel Blotto game with D battlefields. By applying the
time sharing (or division) technique, the defender (or attacker)
can scan (or attack) multiple storage devices with a single
CPU in a time slot, which can be approximately formulated
as a continuous CBG. In this game, the defender chooses the
defense CPU allocation vector M(k) ∈ △D to scan the D
devices at time k, while the APT attacker chooses the attack
CPU allocation N(k) ∈ △A.
The utility of the defender (or the attacker) at time k denoted
by u
(k)
D (or u
(k)
A ) depends on the size of the data stored in the
D devices, and the data protection level of each device at the
time. In the zero-sum game, by (3) the utility of the defender
is set as
u
(k)
D (M,N) = −u
(k)
A (M,N)
=
D∑
i=1
B
(k)
i sgn (Mi −Ni) . (4)
The CBG-based CPU allocation game rarely has a pure-
strategy NE, because the attack CPU allocation N(k) can be
chosen according to the defense CPU allocation M(k) and to
defeat it for a higher utility u
(k)
A . Therefore, we study the CPU
allocation game with mixed strategies, in which each player
randomizes the CPU allocation strategies to fool the opponent.
In the mixed-strategy CPU allocation game, the defense
strategy at time k denoted by x
(k)
i,j is the probability that
the defender allocates j CPUs to scan device i, i.e., x
(k)
i,j =
Pr
(
M
(k)
i = j
)
. Let pm,j ∈ [0, 1] be the m-th highest feasible
value of x
(k)
i,j . The mixed-strategy defense action set denoted
by PM is given by
PM =
{
[pm,j ]1≤m≤D, 0≤j≤SM
∣∣∣∣pm,j ≥ 0, ∀j;
SM∑
j=0
pm,j = 1, ∀m
}
. (5)
The defense mixed strategy vector denoted by x(k) is given
by
x(k) =
[
x
(k)
i,j
]
1≤i≤D, 0≤j≤SM
∈ PM . (6)
Similarly, let y
(k)
i,j denote the probability that N
(k)
i CPUs
are used to attack device i, i.e., y
(k)
i,j = Pr
(
N
(k)
i = j
)
, and
qm,j ∈ [0, 1] be the m-th highest feasible value of y
(k)
i,j . The
action set of the attacker in the mixed-strategy game denoted
by PN is given by
PN =
{
[qm,j ]1≤m≤D,0≤j≤SN
∣∣∣∣ qm,j ≥ 0, ∀j;
SN∑
j=0
qm,j = 1, ∀m
}
. (7)
The attacker chooses the CPU allocation strategy in this game
denoted by y(k) with
y(k) =
[
y
(k)
i,j
]
1≤i≤D, 0≤j≤SN
∈ PN . (8)
The expected utility of the defender (or the attacker) av-
eraged over all the feasible defense (or attack ) strategies is
denoted by U
(k)
D (or U
(k)
A ) and given by (4) as
U
(k)
D (x, y) = −U
(k)
A (x, y)
= EM∼x
N∼y
(
D∑
i=1
B
(k)
i sgn (Mi −Ni)
)
. (9)
The NE of the CBG-based CPU allocation game with mixed
strategies denoted by (x∗, y∗) provides the best-response pol-
icy, i.e., no player can increase his or her utility by unilaterally
changing from the NE strategy. For example, if the defender
chooses the CPU allocation strategy x∗, the APT attacker
cannot do better than selecting y∗ to attack the D storage
devices. By definition, we have
UD (x
∗, y∗) ≥ UD (x, y
∗) , ∀ x ∈ PM (10)
UA (x
∗, y∗) ≥ UA (x
∗, y) , ∀ y ∈ PN . (11)
We first consider a CBG-based CPU allocation game G1
with symmetric CPU resources, SM = SN , i.e., the defender
and the attacker have the same amount of computational
resources. Let 1m×n (or 0m×n) be an all-1 (or 0) m × n
matrix, ⌊ ⌋ be the lower floor function, and the normalized
defense CPUs β = 2SM/B̂.
Theorem 1. If SM = SN and Bi <
∑
1≤h 6=i≤DBh, the CPU
allocation game G1 has a NE (x
∗, x∗) given by
x∗ =

1
⌊βB1⌋+1
11×(⌊βB1⌋+1) 01×(SM−⌊βB1⌋)
1
⌊βB2⌋+1
11×(⌊βB2⌋+1) 01×(SM−⌊βB2⌋)
...
...
1
⌊βBD⌋+1
11×(⌊βBD⌋+1) 01×(SM−⌊βBD⌋)
 . (12)
Proof. The CPU allocation game G1 can be formulated as a
CBG with symmetric players on D battlefields. The resource
budget of the defender is SM , the value of the i-th battle-
field is Bi, and the total value of D battlefields is B̂. Let
U(m,n) denote the uniform distribution betweenm and n. By
Proposition 1 in [32], the mixed-strategy CBG game has an
NE given by (x∗, x∗), where x∗ is the probability distribution
of M, and each vector coordinate Mi is uniform distribution
between 0 and 2SMBi/B̂. Therefore, the CPU allocation of
the i-th deviceM∗i is uniformly distributed on [0, 2SMBi/B̂],
i.e.,
M∗i ∼ U
({
0, 1, 2, ...,
⌊
2SMBi
B̂
⌋})
. (13)
5Thus this game has an NE given by (x∗, x∗), where ∀ 0 ≤
j ≤ ⌊2SMBiB̂⌋, 0 ≤ i ≤ D, each element of x is given by
x∗i,j = Pr (M
∗
i = j) =
1
⌊2SMBi/B̂⌋+ 1
, (14)
which results in (12).
Corollary 1. At the NE of the symmetric CPU allocation game
G1, the expected data protection level is zero and the utility
of the defender is zero.
Proof. By (3) and (12), the data protection level over all the
realizations of the mixed-strategy NE (x∗, x∗) is given by
Ex∗ (R) = Ex∗
(
1
B̂
D∑
i=1
Bisgn (M
∗
i −N
∗
i )
)
(15)
=
1
B̂
D∑
i=1
Bi
(
Pr (N∗i < M
∗
i )− Pr (N
∗
i > M
∗
i )
)
= 0.
(16)
Similarly, by (4) and (9) , we have UD = UA = 0.
Remark: If the APT attacker and the defender have the
same number of CPUs and no storage device dominates in the
game (i.e., Bi <
∑
1≤h 6=i≤DBh, ∀i), both players choose a
number from {0, 1, ..., ⌊2SMBi/B̂⌋} to attack or scan storage
device i with probability 1/
(
⌊2SMBi/B̂⌋+ 1
)
by (14). The
data protection level R by definition ranges between −1 and
1. Therefore, the game makes a tie, yielding zero expected
data protection level and zero utility of the defender.
We next consider a CBG-based CPU allocation game with
asymmetric players denoted by G2, in which the attacker and
the defender have different number of CPUs and compete over
D storage devices with an equal data size, i.e., Bi = B, ∀i.
Theorem 2. If 2/D ≤ SN/SM ≤ 1, D ≥ 3 and Bi = B,
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ D, the NE of the CPU allocation game G2 (x∗, y∗)
is given by
x∗ =
[
0D×1
1⌊
2SM
D
⌋1
D×
⌊
2SM
D
⌋ 0
D×
(
SM−
⌊
2SM
D
⌋)
]
(17)
y∗ =
[(
1−
SN
SM
)
1D×1
(
SN
SM
⌊
2SM
D
⌋) 1
D×
⌊
2SM
D
⌋
0
D×
(
SM−
⌊
2SM
D
⌋)
]
.
(18)
Proof. The CPU allocation game G2 can be formulated as
a CBG with asymmetric players on D battlefields, where the
defender (or attacker) chooses the probability density functions
x (or y) according to SM (or SN ) resource budget, and the
resources allocated to the i-th battlefield is Mi (or Ni).
By Theorem 2 in [13], the unique Nash equilibrium for the
defender and the attacker with 2/D ≤ SN/SM ≤ 1 is given
by
x(M∗i ) ∼ U
([
0,
2SM
D
])
(19)
y(N∗i ) ∼
(
1−
SN
SM
)
δ(N∗i ) +
SN
SM
U
([
0,
2SM
D
])
. (20)
Therefore, the CPU allocation of the i-th storage deviceM∗i
on NE is uniformly distributed on [0, 2SM/D], i.e.,
M∗i ∼ U
({
0, 1, 2, ...,
⌊
2SM
D
⌋})
. (21)
Thus, the NE strategy of the CPU allocation game G2 is given
by
x∗i,j = Pr (M
∗
i = j) =
1⌊
2SM
D
⌋ , ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊2SM
D
⌋
. (22)
Thus, we have (17).
Similarly, we have
N∗i ∼
(
1−
SN
SM
)
δ(N∗i ) +
SN
SM
U
({
0, 1, 2, ...,
⌊
2SM
D
⌋})
,
(23)
and thus
y∗i,j = Pr (N
∗
i = j) =
1−
SN
SM
, if j = 0
SN
SM
⌊
2SM
D
⌋ , if 1 ≤ j ≤
⌊
2SM
D
⌋
.
(24)
Thus, we have (18).
Corollary 2. At the NE of the CPU allocation game G2, the
expected data protection level is 1− SN/SM and
UD = −UA =
(
1−
SN
SM
)
B̂. (25)
Proof. According to (3), (15), (17) and (18), as Bi = B, we
have
Ex∗,y∗ (R) =
1
B̂
D∑
i=1
Bi (Pr (N
∗
i < M
∗
i )− Pr (N
∗
i > M
∗
i ))
=
1
B̂
D∑
i=1
Bi
(
Pr (M∗i > 0) + Pr
(
N∗i < M
∗
i
∣∣∣∣N∗i 6= 0)
− Pr
(
N∗i > M
∗
i
∣∣∣∣N∗i 6= 0))
=
1
B̂
D∑
i=1
Bi
(
1−
SN
SM
)
= 1−
SN
SM
. (26)
Similarly, by (4) and (9), we have (25).
Remark: The defender has to have more CPU resources
than APT attackers, otherwise the cloud storage system is
unlikely to protect the data privacy. Therefore, a subset of the
storage devices are safe from the attacker who has to match
the defender on the other storage devices. In this case, the
defender wins the game, and the utility increases with the
total data size. The expected data protection level increases
with the resource advantage of the defender over the attacker,
i.e., SM/SN .
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Fig. 2. APT defense performance of the CBG-based CPU allocation game
G2 at the NE with D storage devices and SM defense CPUs against an APT
attacker with 150 CPUs.
The APT defense performance of the CPU allocation game
G2 at the NE is presented in Fig. 2, in which the D storage
devices are threatened by an APT attacker with 150 attack
CPUs. If the defender uses 1200 CPUs instead of 600 CPUs
to scan the 20 devices, the data protection level increases
about 10.5% to 93% and the utility of the defender increases
by 18.75%, The data protection level of the cloud storage
system protected by 1200 CPUs slightly decreases by 2.8%,
if the number of the storage devices D changes from 20 to
80. The APT defense performance of the CBG game at the
NE provides the optimal defense performance with known
APT attack model and defense model, and can be used as
a guideline to design the CPU allocation scheme.
V. HOTBOOTING PHC-BASED CPU ALLOCATION
As a defender is usually unaware of the attack policy, we
propose a hotbooting PHC-based CPU allocation scheme to
scan D storage devices in the dynamic APT detection game,
as illustrated in Fig. 3. At each time slot, the defender of
the cloud storage system observes the amount of the data
stored in each storage device that is quantized into L levels,
B
(k)
i ∈ {l/L}0≤l≤L. In addition, the defender also evaluates
the compromised storage devices that are found to be attacked
Fig. 3. Illustration of the hotbooting PHC-based defense CPU allocation.
by APTs in the last time slot, and uses them to estimate the last
attack CPU allocation N(k−1). The defense CPU allocation is
chosen according to the current state denoted by s(k), which
consists of the current data sizes and the previous attack CPU
allocation, i.e., s(k) = {N(k−1),B(k)}. The resulting defense
strategy M(k) ∈ △D, where △D is the defense action set
given by (2).
Algorithm 1 CPU allocation with hotbooting PHC
1: Hotbooting defense process in Algorithm 2
2: Initialize α, γ, δ, N(0) and B(1)
3: Set Q = Q, pi = pi
4: for k = 1, 2, 3, ... do
5: Observe the current data size B(k)
6: s(k) = {N(k−1),B(k)}
7: Choose M(k) ∈ △D with pi(s(k),M) via (30)
8: for i = 1, 2, ...D do
9: Allocate M
(k)
i CPUs to scan storage device i
10: end for
11: Observe the compromised storage devices and estimate
N(k)
12: Obtain u
(k)
D via (4)
13: Update Q(s(k),M(k)) via (27)
14: Update V (s(k)) via (28)
15: Update pi(s(k),M) via (29)
16: end for
The Q-function for each action-state pair denoted by
Q (s,M) is the expected discounted long-term reward of the
defender, and is updated in each time slot according to the
iterative Bellman equation as follows:
Q
(
s(k),M(k)
)
← (1− α)Q
(
s(k),M(k)
)
+ α
(
u
(k)
D + γV (s
′)
)
, (27)
where the learning rate α ∈ (0, 1] is the weight of the
current experience, the discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1] indicates
the uncertainty of the defender on the future reward, s′ is the
next state if the defender uses M(k) at state s(k), and the value
7function V (s) maximizes Q (s,M) over the action set given
by
V
(
s(k)
)
= max
M′∈△D
Q
(
s(k),M′
)
. (28)
The mixed-strategy table of the defender denoted by
pi (s,M) provides the distribution of the number of CPUs M
over the D storage devices under state s and is updated via
pi(s(k),M) ← pi(s(k),M)
+
δ, if M = argmaxM′∈△D Q
(
s(k),M′
)
δ
1−|△D|
, o.w.
(29)
In this way, the probability of the action that maximizes the
Q-function increases by δ, with 0 < δ ≤ 1, and the probability
of other actions decrease by δ/ (|△D| − 1). The defender then
selects the number of CPUs M(k) ∈ △D according to the
mixed strategy pi
(
s(k),M
)
, i.e.,
Pr
(
M(k) = M̂
)
= pi
(
s(k), M̂
)
, ∀ M̂ ∈ △D. (30)
We apply the hotbooting technique to initialize both the
Algorithm 2 Hotbooting defense process
1: Initialize ξ, K , α, γ, δ, N(0) and B(1)
2: Set Q = 0(|△A|×LD)×|△D |, V = 0(|△A|×LD)×1, pi =
1
|△D |
3: for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., ξ do
4: Emulate a similar CPU allocation scenario for the
defender to scan storage devices
5: for k = 1, 2, ...,K do
6: Observe the current data size B(k)
7: s(k) = {N(k−1),B(k)}
8: Choose M(k) ∈ △D via (30)
9: for j = 1, 2, ...D do
10: Allocate M
(k)
j CPUs to scan storage device j
11: end for
12: Observe the compromised storage devices and esti-
mate N(k)
13: Obtain u
(k)
D via (4)
14: Update Q and pi via (27)-(29)
15: end for
16: end for
17: Output Q← Q, pi ← pi
Q-value and the strategy table pi with the CPU allocation
experiences in similar environments. The hotbooting PHC-
based CPU allocation saves random explorations at the be-
ginning stage of the dynamic game and thus accelerates the
learning speed. As shown in Algorithm 2, ξ CPU allocation
experiences are performed before the game. Each experiment
lasts K time slots, in which the defender chooses the number
of CPUs to scan theD storage devices according to the mixed-
strategy table pi
(
s(k),M
)
. The defender observes the attack
CPU distribution and evaluates the utility u
(k)
D . Both the Q-
function and pi are updated via (27)-(29) in each time in the
experiences.
The Q-values as the output of the hotbootng process based
on the ξ experiences denoted by Q is used to initialize the Q-
values in Algorithm 1. Similarly, the mixed-strategy table as
the output of Algorithm 2 based on the ξ experiences denoted
by pi is used to initialize pi in Algorithm 1. The learning time
of Algorithm 1 increases with the dimension of the action-state
space |△D| × |△A| × LD, which increases with the number
of storage devices in the cloud storage system and the number
of CPUs, yielding serious performance degradation.
VI. HOTBOOTING DQN-BASED CPU ALLOCATION
In this section, we propose a hotbooting DQN-based CPU
allocation scheme to improve the APT defense performance
of the cloud storage system. This scheme applies deep convo-
lutional neural network, a deep reinforcement learning tech-
nique, to compress the action-state space and thus accelerate
the learning process. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the deep convo-
lution neural network is a nonlinear approximator of the Q-
value for each action. The CNN architecture allows a compact
storage of the learned information between similar states [33].
The DQN-based CPU allocation as summarized in Algo-
rithm 3 extends the system state s(k) as in Algorithm 1 to the
experience sequence at time k denoted by ϕ(k) to accelerate
the learning speed and improve the APT resistance. More
specifically, the experience sequence consists of the current
system state s(k) and the previousW system state-action pairs,
i.e., ϕ(k) =
(
s(k−W ),M(k−W ), ..., s(k−1),M(k−1), s(k)
)
. The
experience sequence ϕ(k) is reshaped into a 5 × 5 matrix
and then input into the CNN, as shown in Fig. 4. The CNN
consists of two convolutional (Conv) layers and two fully
connected (FC) layers, with parameters chosen to achieve a
good performance according to the experiment results as listed
in Table II. The filter weights of the four layers in the CNN
at time k are denoted by θ(k) for simplicity. The first Conv
layer includes 20 different filters. Each filter has size 2 × 2
and uses stride 1. The output of the first Conv is 20 different
4 × 4 feature maps that are then passed through a rectified
linear function (ReLU) as an activation function. The second
Conv layer includes 40 different filters. Each filter has size
2 × 2 and stride 1. The outputs of the 2nd Conv layer are
40 different 3× 3 feature maps, which are flattened to a 360-
dimension vector and then sent to the two FC layers. The first
FC layer involves 180 rectified linear units, and the second
FC layer provides the Q-value for each CPU allocation policy
M ∈ △D at the current system sequence ϕ(k).
TABLE II
CNN PARAMETERS
Layer Conv1 Conv2 FC1 FC2
Input 5× 5 4× 4× 20 360 180
Filter size 2× 2 2× 2 / /
Stride 1 1 / /
# Filters 20 40 180 |△D|
Activation ReLU ReLU ReLU ReLU
Output 4× 4× 20 3× 3× 40 180 |△D|
8Fig. 4. Hotbooting DQN-based defense CPU allocation.
The Q-function as the expected long-term reward for the
state sequence ϕ and the action M, is given by definition as
Q
(
ϕ
(k),M
)
= Eϕ′
[
u
(k)
D + γmax
M′
Q
(
ϕ
′,M′
)
|ϕ(k),M
]
,
(31)
where ϕ′ is the next state sequence by choosing defense CPU
allocation M at state ϕ(k).
To make a tradeoff between exploitation and exploration, the
defense CPU allocation is chosen according to the ε-greedy
policy [34]. More specifically, the CPU allocation M(k) that
maximizes the Q-function is chosen with a high probability
1− ε, and other actions are selected with a low probability to
avoid staying in the local maximum, i.e.,
Pr
(
M(k) = M̂
)
=
{
1− ε, M̂ = arg maxM′Q
(
ϕ
(k),M′
)
ε
|△D|−1
, o.w.
(32)
Based on the experience replay as shown in Fig. 4, the
CPU allocation experience at time k denoted by e(k) is given
by e(k) =
(
ϕ
(k),M(k), u
(k)
D ,ϕ
(k+1)
)
, and saved in the replay
memory pool denoted by D, with D =
{
e(1), · · · , e(k)
}
. An
experience e(d) is chosen from the memory pool at random,
with 1 ≤ d ≤ k. The CNN parameters θ(k) are updated
by the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm in which
the mean-squared error between the network’s output and
the target optimal Q-value is minimized with the minibatch
updates. The loss function denoted by L in the stochastic
gradient descent algorithm is chosen as
L
(
θ(k)
)
= E
ϕ,M,u
(k)
D
,ϕ′
{(
G−Q
(
ϕ,M; θ(k)
))2}
, (33)
where the target value denoted by G approximates the opti-
mal value u
(k)
D + γQ
∗
(
ϕ
′,M′
)
based on the previous CNN
parameters θ(k−1), and is given by
G = u
(k)
D + γmax
M′
Q
(
ϕ
′,M′; θ(k−1)
)
. (34)
The gradient of the loss function with respect to the weights
θ(k) is given by
∇θ(k)L
(
θ(k)
)
= Eϕ,M,uD ,ϕ′
[
G∇θ(k)Q
(
ϕ,M; θ(k)
)]
− Eϕ,M
[
Q
(
ϕ,M; θ(k)
)
∇θ(k)Q
(
ϕ,M; θ(k)
)]
. (35)
This process repeats H times to update θ(k) in Algorithm 3.
Similar to Algorithm 1, we apply the hotbooting technique
to initialize the CNN parameters in the DQN-based CPU
allocation rather than initializing them randomly to accelerate
the learning speed. As shown in Algorithm 4, the defender
stores the emulational experience
(
ϕ
(k),M(k), u
(k)
D ,ϕ
(k+1)
)
in the database E and the resulting θ based on ξ experiences
are used to set θ as shown in Algorithm 3.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulations have been performed to evaluate the APT
defense performance of the CPU allocation schemes in a cloud
storage system, with the CNN parameters as listed in Table II.
In the simulations, some APT attackers applied the ε-greedy
algorithm to choose the number of CPUs to attack each of
the D storage devices based on the defense history and some
9Algorithm 3 Hotbooting DQN-based CPU allocation
1: Initialize N(0), B(1), W and H
2: Set θ = θ, D = ∅
3: for k = 1, 2, 3, ... do
4: Observe the current data size B(k)
5: s(k) = {N(k−1),B(k)}
6: if k ≤W then
7: Choose M(k) ∈ △D at random
8: else
9: ϕ
(k) =
(
s(k−W ),M(k−W ), ..., s(k−1),M(k−1), s(k)
)
10: Set ϕ(k) as the input of the CNN
11: Observe the output of the CNN to obtain
Q
(
ϕ
(k),M
)
12: Choose M(k) ∈ △D via (32)
13: end if
14: for i = 1, 2, ...D do
15: Allocate M
(k)
i CPUs to scan storage device i
16: end for
17: Observe the compromised storage devices and estimate
N(k)
18: Obtain u
(k)
D via (4)
19: Observe ϕ(k+1)
20: D ← D
⋃(
ϕ
(k),M(k), u
(k)
D ,ϕ
(k+1)
)
21: for d = 1, 2, 3, ..., H do
22: Select
(
ϕ
(d),M(d), u
(d)
D ,ϕ
(d+1)
)
∈ D at random
23: Calculate G via (34)
24: end for
25: Update θ(k) via (35)
26: end for
smarter attackers first induced the defender to use a specific
“optimal” defense strategy based on the estimated defense
learning algorithm and then attacked the system accordingly.
We set α = 0.9, γ = 0.5, δ = 0.02, W = 12, and H = 16, if
not specified otherwise, to achieve good security performance
according to the experiments not presented in this paper.
In the first simulation, the defender with 10 CPUs resisted
the attacker with 2 CPUs over 10 storage devices, each with
normalized data size. As shown in Fig. 5, the hotbooting DQN-
based CPU allocation scheme achieves the optimal policy
in a dynamic APT defense game after convergence, which
matches the theoretical results of the NE given by Theorem
2. For example, the data privacy level almost converge to
the NE given by (26), and the utility of the defender almost
converge to the NE given by (25). The hotbooting DQN-
based CPU allocation scheme outperforms the hotbooting PHC
with a faster learning speed, a higher data protection level
and a higher utility. The latter in turn exceeds both PHC
and Q-learning. For instance, the data protection level of the
hotbooting DQN-based scheme is 14.92% higher than the
PHC-based scheme at time slot 1000, which is 30.51% higher
than the Q-learning based scheme. As a result, the hotbooting
DQN-based scheme has a 14.92% higher utility than the PHC-
based strategy at time slot 1000, which is 30.51% higher than
that of the Q-learning based strategy. As the hotbooting DQN-
based algorithm, an extension of Q learning, compress the
Algorithm 4 Hotbooting process for Algorithm 3
1: Initialize N(0), B(1), θ(0), ξ, K and E = ∅
2: for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., ξ do
3: Emulate a similar CPU allocation scenario for the
defender to scan storage devices
4: for k = 1, 2, 3, ...,K do
5: Observe the output of the CNN to obtain
Q
(
ϕ
(k),M
)
6: Choose M(k) via (32)
7: for i = 1, 2, ...D do
8: Allocate M
(k)
i CPUs to scan storage device i
9: end for
10: Observe the compromised storage devices and esti-
mate N(k)
11: Obtain u
(k)
D via (4)
12: Observe the resulting state sequence ϕ(k+1)
13: E← E
⋃(
ϕ
(k),M(k), u
(k)
D ,ϕ
(k+1)
)
14: Perform minibatch update as steps 19-23 in Algo-
rithm 3 to update θ(k)
15: end for
16: end for
17: Output θ ← θ(k)
learning state space by using CNN to accelerate the learning
process and enhance the security performance of the cloud
storage system. If the interaction time is long enough, the
hotbooting PHC and Q-learning scheme can also converge to
the NE of the theoretical results in Theorem 2. The PHC-
based scheme has less computation complexity than DQN.
For example, the PHC-based strategy takes less than 4% of
the time to choose the CPU allocation in a time slot compared
with the DQN-based scheme.
In the second simulation, the size of the data stored in each
of the 3 storage devices of the cloud storage system changed
every 1000 time slots. The total data size increases 1.167 times
at the 1000-nd time slot and then increases 1.143 times at the
2000-nd time slot. The cloud storage system used 16 CPUs to
scan the storage devices and the APT attacker used 4 CPUs
to attack them. Besides, the attack policy changed every 1000
time slots. The APT attacker estimated the “optimal” defense
CPU allocation due to the learning algorithm and launched
an attack specifically against the estimated defense strategy at
time slot 1000 and 2000 to steal data from the cloud storage
system. As shown in Fig. 6, the hotbooting DQN-based CPU
allocation is more robust against smart APTs and the time-
variant cloud storage system. For example, the data protection
level of the hotbooting DQN-based scheme is 30.98% higher
than that of the PHC-based scheme at time slot 1000, which
is 97.87% higher than that of the Q-learning based scheme.
As a result, the hotbooting DQN-based scheme has a 30.69%
higher utility than the PHC-based strategy at time slot 1000,
which is 96.97% higher than the Q-learning based strategy.
As shown in Fig. 7, both the data protection level and
the utility increase with the number of defense CPUs. For
instance, if the number of the defense CPUs changes from
12 to 16, the data protection level and the utility of the
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Fig. 5. APT defense performance of the cloud storage system with 10 storage
devices and 10 defense CPUs against an APT attacker with 2 attack CPUs.
The size of data stored in each storage device is 1.
defender with hotbooting DQN-based APT defense increase
by 14.20% and 14.03%, respectively. In the dynamic game
with SM = 16, D = 3 and SN = 4, the data protection
level of the hotbooting DQN-based scheme is 15.85% higher
than that of PHC, which is 21.62% higher than Q-learning,
and the utility of the hotbooting DQN-based CPU allocation
scheme is 15.04% higher than PHC, which is 21.64% higher
than Q-learning.
As shown in Fig. 8, the APT defense performance slightly
decreases with more number of storage devices D in a cloud
storage system. However, the hotbooting DQN-based scheme
still maintains a high data protection level, i.e., R = 92.50%,
if 4 storage devices are protected by 21 CPUs and attacked
by 4 CPUs. In another example, the hotbooting DQN-based
scheme can protect up to 80.05% of the data stored in 6
storage devices in the cloud. The defender with less number
of CPUs has to distribute its resources among all the storage
devices to resist APTs, as at least one CPU has to scan each
storage device. The performance gain of the hotbooting DQN-
based CPU allocation scheme over the hotbooting PHC-based
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Fig. 6. APT defense performance of the cloud storage system with 3 storage
devices and 16 defense CPUs against an APT attacker with 4 attack CPUs.
Both the size of data stored on each device and the attack policy change every
1000 time slots.
scheme increases with the number of storage devices in the
cloud system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated a CBG-based CPU
allocation game for the APT defense of cloud storage and
cyber systems and provided the NEs of the game to show
how the number of storage devices, the data sizes in the
storage devices and the total number of CPUs impact on
the data protection level of the cloud storage system and the
defender’s utility. A hotbooting DQN-based CPU allocation
strategy has been proposed for the defender to scan the storage
devices without being aware of the attack model and the data
storage model in the dynamic game. The proposed scheme can
improve the data protection level with a faster learning speed
and is more robust against smart APT attackers that choose the
attack policy based on the estimated defense learning scheme.
For instance, the data protection level of the cloud storage
system and the utility of the defender increases by 22.29%
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Fig. 7. APT defense performance of the cloud storage system with SM
defense CPUs, and 3 storage devices that are attacked by 4 attack CPUs,
averaged over 3000 time slots. The size of data stored in each storage device
changes every 1000 time slots.
and 22.4%, respectively, compared with the Q-learning based
scheme in the cloud storage system with 4 storage devices
and 16 defense CPUs against an APT attacker with 4 CPUs.
A hotbooting PHC-based CPU allocation scheme can reduce
the computation complexity.
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